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SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMBINED METALS REDUCTION COMPANY, 
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EUREKA LILLY CONSOLIDATED MINING 
CO.MPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
TINTIC STANDARD MINING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
COLORADO CONSOLIDATED MINING 
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
CHIEF CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
MONTANA BINGHAM CONSOLIDATED 
MINING COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
UNITED STATES SMELTING, REFINING 
AND MINING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
EUREKA BULLION MINING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
INTERNATIONAL SMELTING AND REFINING 
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
NATIONAL TUNNEL & MINES COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
OHIO COPPER COMPANY OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION and J. LAMBERT 
GIBSON, ROSCOE E. HAMMOND, MIL TON 
TWITCHELL and HEBER BENNION, JR., con· 
stituting said Tax Commission, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
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Case No. 6869 
Case No. 6870 
Case No. 6871 
Case No. 6872 
Case No. 6873 
Case No. 6874 
Case No. 68 7 5 
Case No. 6876 
Case No. 6877 
Case No. 6878 
Case No. 6879 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
These cases involve appeals from judgments entered 
in favor of the Eureka Lilly Consolidated Mining Com-
pany, Tintic Standard Mining Company, Montana Bing-
ham Consolidated Mining Company, Chief Consolidated 
Mining Company, Colorado Consolidated Mines Com-
pany, Eureka Bullion Mining Company, U. S. Smelting, 
Refining and Mining Company, International Smelting 
and Refining Company, National Tunnel and Mines Com-
pany, Ohio Copper Company of Utah and the Combined 
Metals Reduction Company, in actions brought by the 
respective companies against the appellants herein in the 
District Court of Utah. The issues in all cases being the 
same, the causes were consolidated for trial (Rec. 89-90). 
The trial court without a jury heard the cases. The 
parties submitted written stipulations in lieu of testimony 
(Rec. 89-90). The court gave judgment for the plaintiff 
in each case (Rec. 91). On appeal the points raised with 
respect to each case being the same, the causes have been 
consolidated for purpose of printing the record, submit-
ting the brief and argument before the court. 
Appellant in its brief will refer to the record in 
the case of the Combined Metals Reduction Company 
vs. State Tax Commission, No. 6869, exclusively, except 
as otherwise indicated. 
The cases arise out of the payment under protest, of 
certain occupation taxes to the State of Utah by the re-
spondents, hereinafter referred to as the Mining Com-
panies. Section 80-5-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, pro-
vides in part that: 
2 
'' * * * every person engaged in the business 
of mining or producing ore containing gold, silver, 
copper, lead, iron, zinc or other valuable metal in 
this state, shall pay to the State of Utah an oc-
cupation tax equal to 1 per cent of the gross 
amount received for or the gross value of the 
metalliferous ore sold which tax shall he in addi-
tion to all other taxes provided by law * * *. '' 
During the calender year 1943 the Mining Com-
panies, in addition to the amounts received from private 
enterprise for the sale or other disposal of their ores, also 
received certain sums of money from the Federal Govern-
ment through Metals Reserve Company, pursuant to a 
"premium payment program" (Rec. 73). In assessing 
said occupation tax, the State Tax Commission of Utah 
included in the ''gross amount received for or the gross 
value of metalliferous ore sold," the "premium pay-
ments" received by each of the Mining Companies. The 
Companies, with respect to that portion of the tax at-
tributable to the respective amounts received from Metals 
Reserve Company, paid the same under protest, and 
brought suit in the District Court of Utah in and for Salt 
Lake County to recover the amount so paid. The Com-
panies alleged, in substance and effect, that the amounts 
received by them from Metals Reserve Company were 
in no manner related to the sale or other disposition of 
the various ores, without regard to the same, and were 
in no wise a part of the value of such ores; that the as-
sessments were an immediate and direct and substantial 
mterference with, and burden upon, the National Govern-
ment and the exercise by the National Government of its 
legislative function of prosecuting war; that said assess-
3 
ments were wholly in excess of the power of appellants 
and were an arbitrary usurpation of power and the 
taking of property of the respective companies without 
due process of law, in violation of Section 1 of the 14th 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and 
Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
In answer to the complaints, it was alleged in sub-
stance and effect that the amounts received by the Mining 
Companies from the Federal Government through Metals 
Reserve Company were paid pursuant to a ''premium 
price plan" sponsored by the said Metals Reserve Com-
pany; that in accordance with such plan Metals Reserve 
Company paid ''premium prices'' for production of cop-
per, lead and zinc, in excess of certain quotas established 
by the War Production Board and the Office of Price 
Administration, said premium prices being based on l7c 
per pound for copper, llc per pound for zinc, 91Jtc per 
pound for lead. Said program was fully set forth in the 
Affirmative Defense filed by appellants in each case 
(Rec. 16-21). From the facts set forth in appellants' 
answer in each case, appellants further alleged that the 
amounts received by each of the Companies from the 
Metals Reserve Company, presented a part of the ''gross 
amount received for or the gross value of'' the various 
metalliferous ores sold by the respective Mining Com-
panies during the calender year 1943 (Rec. 21), and 
denied that the inclusion of such amounts as a part of the 
"gross amount" was an interference with or burden upon 
the National Government in its function of prosecuting 
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the war or that the same was without authority of law or 
a taking of property without due process of law as al-
leged in plaintiff's complaint (Rec. 3). 
Upon the pleadings, the issues of law to be deter-
mined are: (1.) whether the taxation of the premium pay-
ments was authorized by Utah law, and (2.) whether the 
taxation of such payments was a taxation of the means 
used by the Federal Government in the prosecution of the 
war and consequently beyond the powers of the state to 
make a direct levy upon government activities or facili-
ties. 
In the trial of the causes, counsel for the respective 
parties introduced a statement of facts and a compilation 
of what was deemed to be the pertinent statutes and or-
ders and announcements of the various Federal Agencies. 
The court in rendering its decisions held: 
''I am of the opinion that the premiums or bonus 
paid by Metals Reserve Company cannot, under the 
statutes of the State of Utah involved, be considered a 
part of the 'gross proceeds' of bona fide sales of the 
metal products of plaintiff mining companies, but that 
such payments constitute an inducement to increase pro-
duction, adding nothing to the intrinsic value of the metal 
that would in any way affect its sale price on a free and 
open market to any independent and unhampered pur-
chaser. The State Tax Commission of Utah, in the 
opinion of this court, had no authority to levy or collect 
an occupational tax from the plaintiff mining, including 
in the base used for such purposes, the subsidy payments 
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paid to the plaintiff corporations by the United States 
Government.'' 
From the judgment in each case, these appeals were 
taken (Rec. 95). 
SPECIFICATION OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
For the purpose of argument, appellants have 
grouped their statement of points under two general 
headings: 
(1) The amounts received by the respective Mining 
Companies from Metals Reserve Company were properly 
included as a part of the ''gross amount received for or 
the gross value of metalliferous ore sold" within the 
meaning and contemplation of the Utah statutes. (2) 
The inclusion thereof was not prohibited by the State or 
Federal Constitutution8. 
ARGUMENT I 
The occupation tax imposed by Section 80-5-66, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, is one per cent of the "gross 
amount received for or the gross value of metalliferous 
ore sold.'' The problem, therefore, is whether the 
amounts received by the respective Mining Companies 
from Metals Reserve Company, in connection with the 
production and sale of the ores produced by the respec-
tive Mining Companies in the calender year 1943, forms a 
part of such ''gross amount received for or gross value 
of" such metalliferous ores. In considering this point, 
we call the court's attention to the following pertinent 
facts relative to the "premium payment plan" (Rec. 73). 
1. The Office of Price Administration, on or about 
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August 2, 1941, issued its price schedule No. 15 whereby 
it was provided that on and after February 1, 1942, no 
person should sell, offer to sell, deliver or transfer and no 
person should buy, offer to buy, or accept delivery of cop-
per at a price higher than 12c per pound (Hec. 39). At or 
about the same time price schedules No. 69 and No. 81 
were issued with respect to lead and zinc whereby it was 
provided that on and after the effective date (January 
15, 1942, for lead, and January 28, 1942, for zinc) no per-
son should sell, offer to sell, deliver or transfer and no 
person should buy, offer to buy, or accept delivery of 
primary lead or primary slab zinc in excess of the ceiling 
prices set forth in the schedules, to-wit: 6Y2 c per pound 
for lead and 8~c per pound for zinc (Rec. 42-44). 
2. It was immediately apparent, however, that at the 
ceiling prices fixed by the Office of Price Administration, 
very little of these highly critical ores would be produced 
and put at the disposal of the Federal Government in 
connection with its war program. It was, therefore, an-
nounced on January 12, 1942, by the Federal Loan Ad-
ministrator, the Honorable Jesse Jones, that at the re- . · '~· 
quest of the OPM and OP A, Metals Reserve Company 
would ''for a period of two and one-half years from Feb-
ruary 1, 1942, pay 11 cents per pound East St. Louis for 
zinc, 9~ cents per pound New York for lead, and 17 cents 
per pound Connecticut Valley for copper, for increases 
above 1941 production governed by quotas to be fixed.'' 
3. This "premium price plan," as more fully out-
lined by a joint statement issued on February 9, 1942, by 
the War Production Board and the Office of Price Ad-
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ministration, provides that the plan is "one of the steps 
taken to increase production;'' that premium prices based 
on 17 c per pound for copper, llc per pound for zinc, and 
9%c per pound for lead, would be paid in excess of quotas 
to be established jointly by the War Production Board 
and the Office of Price Administration; that in general, 
quotas would be established at the normal production rate 
for 1941, but that in special cases different quotas would 
be fixed, depending upon individual circumstances (Rec . 
. 15). The premium payments were made to respondent 
/herein upon the basis of a fixed percentage of total metal 
1
1 content of the ores or concentrates produced, based upon 
. the normal metal recovery for such ores or concentrates. 
: (Rec. 47-48.) 
4. The amount actually to be paid by Metals Reserve 
Company is set forth in the'' Program for Premium Pay-
ments by Metals Rese.rve Company on Production of Cop-
per, Lead and Zinc in Excess of Monthly Production 
Quotas" issued March 7, 1942. It is therein stated that 
Metals Reserve Company would pay the ''difference be-
tween the respective ceiling prices for the materials in-
volved and the equivalent of 17 c per pound Connecticut 
Valley for copper, 91;;'tc per pound New York for lead and 
llc per pound East St. Louis for zinc.'' The program 
also provides that various smelting companies through-
out the United States would be designated as agents for 
Metals Reserve Company in connection with the making 
of the premium payments. (Rec. 48) Thus the producer 
J would receive the ceiling prices for his ores from the 
1 smelter to which they were shipped and at the same time 
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would receive from Metals Reserve Company through the ;· 
very same smelter the premium payments for his ores 1 
produced in excess of quota. 
5. 'l'he producer in each case was guaranteed by 
Metals Reserve Company the sum of 17 c per pound for 
copper, 9%c per pound for lead, and llc per pound for 
zinc until July 31, 1945, for all of such ores produced in 
excess of quota unless the National Emergency should 
terminate prior thereto, in which case notice of termi-
nation of the program was required to be given thirty 
days in advance. 'l'hereupon adjustments would be made 
with each producer as in said program set forth (Rec. 
49). However, as stated above, Metals Reserve Company 
paid only the amount in excess of the ceiling price, allow-
ing the smelter or processor to pay such ceiling price to 
the producer. 
6. In order to obtain payment of the premiums 
quoted, each producer, representing himself as eligible 
for such premium payment must" (1.) cause the smelting 
company to which he ships to be furnished, as agent for 
Metals Reserve Company, with a sworn producer's af-
fidavit * * * showing, among other things, the amount of 
material in excess of quota delivered during the month 
covered by such affidavit for which he has been paid or 
will be paid and on which he is eligible for a premium, 
and (2.) cause the smelting company to be furnished with 
all necessary information so as to enable it to supply 
Metals Reserve Company with a statement setting out all 
data required for the making of the premium payments'' 
(Rec. 49). 
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7. The producer, in the affidavit filed with the 
smelting company, sets out that he "produced, and de-
livered for sale during the month'' mentioned to the 
particular smelting or refining company the amount of 
material listed (Rec. 52). 
8. Following the receipt of the foregoing affidavit, 
together with the statement of its agent, Metals Reserve 
Company agreed to make payment of the premiums 
promptly to the producer (Rec. 4D). 
9. In order to relieve the Mining Companies from 
the provisions of price schedules Nos. 15, 69 and 81 here-
inbefore referred to, prohibiting sales or deliveries of 
copper, lead or zinc at prices higher than maxium prices 
fixed, the Office of Price Administration issued its sup-
plementary regulation No. 4 exempting from the general 
maximum price regulation "sales or deliveries" of metal-
lic copper, lead, or zinc, or of ores or concentrates con-
taining copper, lead or zinc, to the Metals Reserve Com-
pany, or its duly authorized agent or agents, pursuant to 
the premium ~price plan announced hy the Federal Loan 
Agency, the War Production Board, and the Office of 
Price Administration.'' 
10. Metals Reserve Company was originally incor-
porated pursuant to Section 5 (d) of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation Act to "produce, acquire, carry, 
sell, or otherwise deal in strategic and critical materials." 
Section 5 (d) of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
when requested by the Federal Loan Administrator, with 
the approval of the President, to create corporations with 
power "to produce, acquire, carry, sell or otherwise deal 
10 
11. Net Proceeds Valuation Reported by Protesting Companies and Valuations Assessed by Tax 
Commission, Tax Assessment for 1944, Operations for 1943 
Reported Basis Assessment 
for Metal Basis for Occupation Occupation 
Computation Premium Computation Tax Tax 
of Tax Payments of Tax Reported Assessed 
Chief Consolidated Mining Co. ____________ $ 105,227.92 $492,238.84 $ 597,466.76 $ 1,052.28 $ 5,974.67 
Colorado Consolidated Mines Co. __________ 1,538.25 13,758.12 15,296.37 15.38 152.96 
Combined Metals Reduction Co.-
Butterfield Mine ------------------------------ 168,971.12 238,209.81 407,180.93 1,689.71 4,071.81 
Combined Metals Reduction Co.-
Calumet Mine ---------------------------------- 370,679.96 272,150.86 642,830.82 3,706.80 6,428.31 
Eagle & Blue Bell Mining Co. ________________ 31,293.06 1,439.39 32,732.45 312.93 327.32 
Eureka Bullion Mining Co. ____________________ 71,332.77 7,144.87 78,477.64 713.33 784.78 
Eureka Lilly Cons. Mining Co. ______________ 24,565.19 10,792.25 35,357.44 245.65 353.57 
International Smelting Co.-
Tintic Bullion Mine__________________________ 294,910.16 25,892.69 320,802.85 2,949.10 3,208.03 
Montana Bingham Cons. Mining Co. ___ 64,171.43 32,958.59 97,130.02 641.71 971.30 
National Tunnel & Mines Co. ________________ 322,949.32 886,975.64 1,209,924.96 3,229.49 12,099.25 
Niagara Mining Co. ________________________________ 30,358.95 1,227.85 31,586.80 303.59 315.87 
Ohio Copper Co. of Utah ________________________ 234,027.18 142,889.45 376,916.63 2,300.46 3,729.36 
Park Utah Cons. Mines Co. ____________________ 740,805.95 905,506.66 1,646,312.61 7,408.06 16,463.13 
Tin tic Standard Mining Co. _________________ 640,760.99 440,494.16 1,081,255.15 6,407.61 10,812.55 
U. S. Smelting Co.-
Hidden Treasure Mine ___________________ 124,693.74 24,489.40 149,183.14 1,246.94 1,491.83 
U. S. Smelting Co.-
U.S. & Lark Mine ____________________________ 3,575,831.45 99,078.56 3,674,910.01 35,758.31 36,749.10 
m strategic and critical materials." The Act further 
authorizes any corporation so created" to make payments 
against the purchase price to be paid for strategic and 
critical materials in advance of the delivery of such ma-
terials.'' Thereafter the premium price program herein-
above outlined was sponsored and carried on by Metals 
Reserve Company. 
In our opinion, the mere statement that respondents 
herein received the respective amounts set forth from 
private industry for their ores and the additional amount 
for such ores from Metals Reserve Company should, 
when considered in connection with the language of 
Section 80-5-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, hereinbefore 
set out, be sufficient ground to justify the Tax Com-
mission in combining both of such sums so received by the 
respective Mining Companies for the purpose of fixing 
the occupation tax. However, because of Respondents' 
contentions to the effect that the amounts received from 
Metals Reserve Company were and are not part of the 
"gross amount received" for their ores, and that such 
amounts have no relation to the sale or disposition of the 
ores or to their value, but are mere gifts from the Federal 
Government to the producer, we have deemed it expedient 
to make the foregoing statement of facts indicating the 
picture under which these premium payments are made. 
Such statement, together with other additional facts as 
may be necessary, will be referred to in the course of 
the appellants' argnment in meeting the contentions of 
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Respondents as have been urged throughout the instant 
proceedings. 
It is contended first, that because the premium pay-
ments do not form a part of the amount received by the 
producer from the immediate purchaser in private in-
dustry of such ores at the time such ores are sold, such 
premium payments are not to be included within the 
language "gross amount received for". However, as we 
view the matter, the actual amount of money received at ' 
the time of sale is not the criterion for determining the 
amount of the tax. r.l'he requirement in the statute that 
the tax be levied upon the ''gross amount'' received for 
the ores that have been sold fixes the time of saie as the 
instant or point of tjme at which the occupation tax is to 
accrue or become fixed. lt is not merely what the pro-
ducer may receive at the time title passes but what 
the ''gross amount'' is which the producer has re-
ceived or has become entitled to receive on account 
of the ores up to the time of such sale. It could 
hardly be contended that if the smelter paid to the pro-
ducers a fixed amount at the time the ores are produced 
and another additional amount at the time the ores are 
delivered to the smelters under the contract of sale (at 
which time title to the same would pass from the pro-
ducer to the smelter) that the total amount of money thus 
paid and received would not he the ''gross amount'' 
received for such ore. 
The case of Vause & Striegel, Inc., vs. McKibbin, 379 
Ill. 169; 39 NE (2d) 1006 illustrates this principle very 
well. The Retailers Occupation Tax Act of Illinois im-
13 
posed an occupation tax upon retailers upon the "gross 
receipts" from the sales of tangible personal property. 
As defined in the statute, "gross receipts" meant the 
total selling price or the amount of the sales of such tangi-
ble personal property. Selling price was also defined as 
"the consideration for a sale valued in money, whether 
received in money or otherwise, including cash, credit, 
services and property of every kind or nature and shall 
be determined, without any deduction on account of the 
cost of the property sold, cost of the materials used, labor 
or service cost, or any other expense whatsoever." Plain-
tiffs in that case were engaged in the business of selling 
tangible personal property at retail. Their items were 
priced in advance and advertised in newspapers, circulars 
and by price tags. When a customer appeared and made 
a purchase of an article at the price quoted or indicated, 
he was advised that in addition he would be charged at 
the rate of 3c for every dollar of purchase to cover the 
occupation tax which the retailer had to pay. In some 
instances, if the customer refused to pay the additional 
amount, the sale was consummated without such payment 
being made. The narrow issue involved in the case was 
whether the retailer must pay his occupation tax "upon 
$1.03 or $1 where he prices the same article at $1 but re-
ceives in payment therefor $1.03, the additional three 
cents being designated, as between the retailer and con-
sumer, a payment of tax.'' In determining this question 
the Supreme Court of Illinois held : 
''Plaintiff insists that the additional charge to 
cover the occupation tax received by them is a 
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separate item and not a part of the true selling 
price. It is pointed out that they have transacted 
their sales and received the additional three cents 
from the consumer subsequent to the sale--not 
as a part of the selling price. The plain purpose 
of the Retailer's Occupation Tax Act to exact the 
tax upon all those engaged in the business of sell-
ing at retail in this State cannot be so readily cir-
cumvented and payment of the tax so easily evad-
ed. Conceding that retailers and their customers, 
in some transactions, as disclosed by the stipu-
lated facts, make a distinction between (1) the 
;noney paid for the property transferred and (2) 
the added charge on account of the retailer's oc-
cupation tax, the concession cannot aid them until 
and unless the legislature makes the same dis-
tinction. The mere fact that the retailer and the 
consumer may, by a particular form of billing, 
denominate the three cents additional charge in 
one instance a tax and in another a part of the 
selling price is not decisive. Manifestly, the State 
cannot be deprived of the tax upon tho actual sell-
ing price irrespective of the form of invoice a-
greed upon by a retailer and the purchaser from 
}lim. Again, so far as the consumer is concerned, 
the selling price is $1.03, irrespective of the man-
ner of bookkeeping. If a retailer elects to add the 
three cents exacted of him by the law to the origi-
nal selling price of $1 he is not in a position to 
complain when the State demands that he pay a 
tax on the amount actually received by him from 
the consumer, namely $1.03. In short, where a 
retailer adds the tax which he is required to pay, 
to the purchase price of the merchandise sold by 
him, he must pay the tax on the total amount re-
ceived by him from the consumer. The tenuous 
distinction urged by plaintiffs cannot be sustained. 
It follows, necessarily, that rule No. 20 of the De-
15 
partment of Finance, to the extent challenged, is 
valid.'' 
Likewise, in the instant matters, so far as Re-
spondents are concerned, the ''gross amoup.t'' received 
for their ores is the combined amount received from the 
smelter or processor and the Metals Reserve Company. 
Conversely, in the case of the State vs. Armson,--
Minn. ________ , 207 N. W. 732, involving the occupation tax 
statute of the State of Minnesota, the contracts for the 
sale of ore provided for payments to be made for ore 
monthly as the ore was shipped. Since no deliveries 
could be made during the winter months, the purchaser 
often paid for ore before it was delivered . In such cases 
the contract for purchase provided that the purchaser 
should have a discount from the purchase price normally 
received. Holding that the discount did not affect the 
value of the ore, the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated: 
"* * * in no event do these discounts affect 
either the value or the market price of the ore. 
They represent interest on money paid before it 
is due, or rather an allowance on the purchase 
price for the advantage the seller gains by receiv-
ing his money in advance.'' 
As a matter of fact, under the provisions of our oc-
cupation tax statute (Section 80-5-66, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943) a sale is not necessary, in all cases, in order 
to fix the time or moment at which the occupation tax 
attaches. Subdivision (b) of Section 80-5-66 provides 
that in those instances where the ores are treated at a 
mill, smelter or reduction works owned by the producer 
of the ores and which said mill, smelter or reduction 
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works also receives ores from independent sources ''such 
disposal (meaning the disposal of the ores to the mill, 
smelter or reduction works) shall be treated as a sale 
within the meaning of this section for the purpose of 
determining gross proceeds or otherwise.'' We also ob-
serve in the language just quoted that the term "gross 
proceeds'' is used synonymously with ''gross amount re-
ceived for." The tax being determined as of the time 
said ores are disposed of to the mill, smelter or reduction 
works, the amount which the producer has received or 
will be entitled to receive on account of said ores in the 
crude state they are in would be the determining factor 
in fixing the ''gross amount'' or ''gross proceeds'' re-
ceived from such ores. 'l'oo, the terms ''gross proceeds'' 
and "net proceeds" as used elsewhere in the taxing stat-
utes of the State of Utah (Section 80-5-57, U. C. A. 1943) 
have been defined by our state Supreme Court. In the 
case of Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Company v. Spry, 
16 Utah 222, 52 P. 382, the Court held: 
''By the term 'net annual proceeds of the mine' 
is meant what is annually realized /Tom the prod-
uct of' the mine (gro::os proceeds), over and above 
all the costs and expenses of obtaining such pro-
ceeds and converting the same into money." 
(Italics added). 
This definition of "proceeds" was subsequently 
quoted with approval by U. S. District Court in the case 
of Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Company, 294 
Fed. 199. 
Applying the foregoing principles it would appear 
that the gross amount upon which a producer in the 
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foregoing situation would be required to pay an occu-
pation tax, would be the amount of premium payment 
received from Metals Reserve Company at the time such 
ores are disposed of to the mill, smelter or other reduc-
tion works, plus the ceiling prices for the respective 
ores (which prices the producer would be entitled to 
receive from the purchaser in private industry of the 
ores produced). 
The term ''gross'' as used in statutes taxing ''gross 
income,'' ''gross premiums,'' etc., has been defined by 
numerous courts under varying conditions and circum-
stances. For instance, in the case of State v. Illinois 
Cent. R. Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814, where the statute 
imposed a tax of 7 per cent on the ''gross receipts'' of the 
corporation, the court held that the word "gross" meant 
the ''entire amount, the total sum, without any deduction 
of any kind'' and included receipts derived by the com-
pany for transporting interstate commerce as well as 
receipts derived from intrastate commerce. In Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co. v. Rouillard, ______ N. H. ______ , 
24 Atl. 2d 264, a statute imposing a tax of 2 per cent 
upon the ''gross premiums received'' was construed by 
the court in the following language: 
"There is nothing in the statute to indicate 
that the word 'gross' is not to he given its usual 
meaning of 'whole; entire; total; without deduc-
tion'." 
Again in Hartford Electric Light Company v. 
McLaughlin, 131 Conn. 1, 37 Atl. 2d 361, the court con-
strued the meaning of a statute imposing a tax upon 
"gross earnings from operations" as follows: 
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''When we speak of the 'gross earnings' of 
a person or corporation, we mean the entire earn-
ings of such person or corporation from the 
business or operations to which we refer.'' 
In the case of Hawaii Consolidated Ry. Ltd. v. 
William Borthwick, 34 Hawaii 269, the court was con-
cerned with the meaning of the term "gross" as used 
in connection with the income tax statute. The court 
there stated: 
"As an adjective qualifying the term 'income' 
the word 'gross' implies income from any and all 
sources." (Italics added.) 
It has also been pointed out by the Mining Com-
panies throughout these tax proceedings that the "pre-
mium payments'' were made by Metals Reserve Com-
pany although the title to the ores involved was trans-
ferred elsewhere-to the smelter or other processor in 
accordance with the smelter contracts or other contracts 
under which such ores were, in fact, sold. Such a fact, in 
view of the conditions existing under which these ores 
are disposed of by the producers cannot alter or affect 
the proposition that all monies received both from the 
Federal Government and from private industry form a 
part of the "gross amount" or "gross proceeds" de-
rived from the production and disposition of the ores. 
The P'ederal Government, through its various agen-
cies, is so intimately and intricately connected with the 
producing, refining, processing, fabricating, and distri-
buting such ores, and becomes the ultimate purchaser and 
consumer of such a large part thereof, that any monies 
paid by it to the producer on account of the ores pro-
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duced cannot be distinguished or separated from any 
amounts otherwise received in connection with such ores. 
The producer is called upon by the Government to pro-
duce more and more ores for the war effort. As to such 
production, however, the Office of Price Administration 
fixes a ceiling price at which such ores are to be sold. 
The Government then steps in and agrees to pay the 
producers an additional amount which plan the Office 
of Price Administration approves by supplementary reg-
ulation. The smelters are made the agents of the Federal 
Government for the purpose of receiving the ores and 
paying the premium prices. The producers are required 
to dispose of their ores at the designated smelters before 
such premium prices will be paid. The smelters or other 
processing plants are prohibited from disposing of the 
refined ores or metals except upon allocation by the War 
Production Board as successor to the Supply Priorities 
and Allocations Board. No dealer or refiner is permitted 
to deliver copper to any person requesting such delivery 
without the presentation of an allocation certificate. 
Similar requirements are imposed with respect to lead 
and zinc, and finally the Federal Government becomes 
the ultimate consumer of most, if not practically all, of 
the ores in the form of finished products such as bullets, 
machine guns, tanks, trucks, ships and other products 
used in the prosecution of the war. 
It is admitted that the Federal Government pays 
the premium prices to the producers in order to obtain 
increased production of the ores involved, which in-
creased production the Government must have to prose-
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cute the war. The Government, through the premmm 
prices, pays only for what it gets. As a matter of fact 
it gets a good deal more of the ore production than 
that on which the premium prices are actually paid. It 
has been estimated how much the Government has saved 
in actual dollars and cents by the program hereinbefore 
outlined, it being recognized that the Government is the 
ultimate purchaser and consumer of most of the ores 
produced. Recently the question of continuing the pre-
mium payment program for another year was before 
Congress. In a speech before the House of Representa-
tives, Congressman Patman from Texas produced two 
tables or charts showing the production of the respective 
ores, the cost at ceiling prices, the premiums paid, the 
total thus paid for such ores, the amount that would 
have otherwise been required to be paid for such ores 
without the premium payment program, and the savings 
thus effected. For the year 1943, the year here in ques-
tion, savings of $84,356,000.00 were made on the pro-
duction of copper, $14,702,200.00 on the production of 
lead, and $48,605,700.00 on the production of zinc, or a 
total of $147,663,900.00 on the production of all three 
such metals. See Congressional Record Volume 91, No. 
18, page A381 (January 31, 1945). vV e further quote 
from his speech as follows : 
"At my request, the Office of Price Admin-
istration has prepared some charts on this sub-
ject. One of these tabulations shows the actual 
amount of premiums disbursed by the Govern-
ment in connection with the production of each 
one of these three metals; the other tabulation 
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shows the provable, computable savings to the 
Nation-on a conservative basis-in reference to 
the metals themselves before use for fabrication 
purposes. I feel that these charts are conserva-
tiveiy computed because, for example, 17 cents 
per pound is used as a possible comparative price 
which copper might have sold for in the absence 
of this premium plan whereas, during the last 
war, copper actually sold as high as 37 cents a 
pound during 1917 and averaged, as stated, more 
than 29 cents a pound during that year. If we 
had used the 1917 average figures the estimated 
savings of today would run into many, many 
billions of dollars. 
'' l endeavored also to have prepared tabula-
tions which '.Vould show the savings to the Nation 
in the cost of finished products which are made 
from these three metals, but found that the 
preparation of that additional data would involve 
untold research, much time of valuable employees, 
and would impose too great a burden on industry 
at this time. However, from responsible sources 
in both industry and Government, I get infor-
mation which convinces me that the savings to 
both governmental and civilian purchasers of 
these finished products is at least $1,500,000,000. 
Beyond this, there is the additional saving in 
scrap metal costs which follow the lower costs of 
the basic metals themselves.'' 
To the same effect is a speech, delivered by Sen-
ator Murdock of Utah before the Senate, contained in 
the Congressional Record, Volume 91, No. 49, pages 
2301, 2309 (March 15, 1945). We quote from his speech 
as follows: 
''From the viewpoint of price control, the 
plan has avoided the necessity for general price 
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mcreases for the commodities with a consequent 
over-all savings to the Government, which, being 
the purchaser in one form or another of a large 
part of the production of the metals under war 
conditions, would have had to absorb such price 
increases.'' 
The term "gross amount received for" as set forth 
m Section 80-5-66, and hereinbefore discussed is used 
in connection with the term ''or gross value of.'' That 
is to say, the language of the statute reads "the gross 
amount received for or the gross value of" the ores. 
Respondents therefore argue that the "gross amount" 
cannot be considered to be more than the ''gross value''; 
that the "gross value" of the ores in question is no 
more than the "market value"; that the "market value" 
is fixed by the ceiling prices for the respective ores, so 
that the premium payments made are not reflected in 
the ''gross amount received for or gross value of'' the 
ores in question. The term value is defined by our 
statute (Section 80-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) to 
mean ''the amount to which the property would be taken 
in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.'' 
Again, in the case of State vs. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 
P. 615, our Supreme Court in construing the word 
"value" as used in the statute requiring that all prop-
erty shall be assessed "according to its value in money" 
held: 
"It is evident that the term 'according to its 
value in money' means that all property shall be 
valued, for the purpose of assessment, as near 
as is reasonably practicable, at its full cash value; 
in other words, that the valuation for assess-
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ment and taxation shall be, as near as reasonably 
practicable, equal to the cash price for which the 
property valued would sell in open market, for 
this is doubtless the correct test of the value of 
property." 
With reference to the situation presented in the 
instant matters, however, we do not feel that the fore-
going tests of value can properly be applied. There can 
be no test of determining a ''fair market value'' when 
there is no "open" or "fair" market. At the present 
time the market is closed with respect to competitive 
bidding in buying and selling. Each producer of copper, 
lead and zinc is guaranteed a specific amount by the 
Federal Government, part of which is to be paid by the 
smelting company or other immediate purchaser and the 
balance by the Federal Government through the Metals 
Reserve Company, but in order to receive the same the 
producer must ship its ores to the smelter designated 
by Metals Reserve Company. It cannot go to an "open 
market'' and seek a competitive price. 
Nor, can the amount for which the ores would be 
taken in payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor, 
be used as a criterion for the reason that a solvent debtor 
would not permit his ores to be taken by a creditor in 
payment of a debt for less than the ceiling price plus the 
amount of premium payments to which such debtor-
producer would be entitled. At the same time, it is 
doubtful whether a creditor would care to take such 
ores at that price (being the total amount received for 
such ores as herein indicated) for the reason that such 
creditor may not be eligible to receive the premium pay-
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ments to which the debtor-producer would be entitled. 
Thus to deprive the debtor-producer of the ores might 
deprive both him and the creditor of the premium pay-
ments. It is also questionable whether, under the allo-
cation program as hereinbefore set forth such ores could, 
in fact, be taken in payment of any debt. If, in fact, they . 
were so taken, they would be subject to the same re-
strictions as to use or sale as all other ores and, there-
fore, would be of no practical value to a creditor. For 
this reason we cannot see how, under any reasonable 
hypothesis, it might be argued that the value of the 
ores here in question must be determined by the ceiling 
price. The value of the ores to the producer is the 
amount he can receive for them-from Metals Reserve 
Company and from the smelter or other private pur-
chaser. He would not part with them for less, nor would 
he have in the original instance mined them except for 
the guarantee given by Metals Reserve Company as to 
the total amount which he would receive therefor. 
Definitions of value which more nearly apply to the 
situation here involved are as follows: 
''A fair return in money, goods, services, etc., 
for something exchanged; that which is considered 
an equivalent in worth."-Webster's New Inter-
national Dictionary. 
'' 'Value' is what the thing will bring today in 
exploitation or exchange under some presently 
possible conditions. "-Babbit vs. Read, C. C. A. 
(2nd) 236 F. 42, 47. 
In his Book, "The Valuation of Property," Pro-
fessor James C. Bon bright says: "The value of prop-
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erty is nothing but the value of an opportunity to 
derive future profits or other services.'' We submit 
· that the value of the ore here in question is the total 
; amount to which, under the artificial conditions existing 
as imposed by the Federal Government, the producer 
is in all events entitled to receive for such ore, irrespec-
tive of the source from which such money is derived. 
This value is linked with the entire production of 
the mine and not with any particular pound of ore or 
the over-quota portion of the ores produced. The pro-
ducer must furnish his quota before he is entitled to 
receive the premiums on the extra production. There-
fore, the ores up to the amount of the quota are imbued 
with a value other than the actual ceiling price, because, 
without them, premium prices could not be received for 
over-production ores. A similar situation exists with 
respect to the amount received by a laborer for his serv-
ices. In most instances, workmen are paid at an hourly 
rate for so many hours a week (similar to the quota 
prescribed for the Respondents herein). However, for 
his services in excess of the stipulated number of hours, 
the workman receives once and a half or twice the 
amount which he received for the regular or normal 
hours of service. As a matter of common knowledge, 
respondents herein pay their workmen upon such a basis. 
Certainly, the extra amount received by the workman 
for overtime is as much a part of the "gross amount" 
or "gross value" of his services as the money received 
for regular time. Nor is he entitled to any overtime 
pay until he has worked in a given week the full normal 
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time prescribed. Respondents, undoubtedly, pay a con-
siderable amount of overtime to workmen in order to 
produce the ores in excess of quota on which they receive 
the premium payml:'nts. .Just as the total amount re-
ceived by the workmen, including overtime, forms a part 
of his gross receipts for income tax purposes and just 
as the gross amount received by the respective Mining 
Companies, including premium payments, forms a part 
of the gross receipts of such Mining Companies for 
income or corporate franchise tax purposes under both 
State and Federal statutes, so we believe must such 
gross amount, including premium payments, be reported 
for the purpose of making the occupation tax assess-
ment herein-which was done in each case by the State 
Tax Commission. 
As hereinbefore indicated, such premium payments 
are definitely recognized as a part of the "gross amount 
received for or gross value of" the respective ores by 
the Federal Government when it was deemed necessary 
by the Office of Price Administration to authorize the 
sale or delivery of the metals pursuant to the premium 
price plan as an exception to the ceiling prices imposed. 
Insofar as ''gross value'' goes, were it not for the re-
strictions placed by the Federal Government upon the 
sale or delivery of copper, lead, and zinc ores, the 
amount which might well be received on an ''open 
market" would be far in excess of the total amount now 
received. See remarks of Representative Patman herein-
before referred to. 
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It was upon such considerations as those expressed 
by Representative Patman and Senator Murdock, call-
ing attention to the savings which had resulted to the 
Federal Government by reason of the premium payment 
plan, which caused Congress to pass an act extending 
the program until .June 30, 1946 ''on the same terms 
as heretofore, except that all classes of premiums shall 
be non-cancellable unless necessary in order to make 
individual adjustments of income to specific mines'' 
(Senate Bill 502). 
It has also been urged that the premium payments 
received by Respondents herein are mere gifts and hence 
not a part of the ''gross amount received for or gross 
value of" the various ores. The District Court in its 
oral decision, characterized the payments as constituting 
an inducement to increase production adding nothing to 
the intrinsic value of the metal. The court said in the 
case of Helvering v. Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. 
(C. C. A. 4th) 93 Fed. (2nd) 875: 
''The amount received by taxpayer from the 
state was in no sense a gift, which is a transfer 
without consideration. Noel v. Parrott, 4 Cir., 15 
F. (2nd) 669; Bogardus v. Commission, 58 S. 
Ct. 61, 82 L. Ed.-It was made in consideration 
of the maintenance of the ferry service; it was 
paid monthly; and its payment would not have 
been continued from month to month if the service 
had not been maintained. 'Bounties granted by 
a government are never pure donations, but are 
allowed either in consideration of services ren-
dered or to be rendered, objects of public interest 
to be obtained, production or manufacture to be 
stimulated, or moral obligations to be recognized.' 
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Allen v. Smith, 173 U. S. 389, 402, 19 S. Ct. 446, 
451, 43 L. Ed. 7 41. '' 
The problem is whether these "subsidies" or "pre-
mium prices'' are a part of the ''gross amount'' received 
for Respondents' ores. There can be no question but 
that such payments are not gifts by the Federal Gov-
ernment to the producers. The quid p~o quo for which 
such premium payments were made, was the actual 
production of the various metals for the Federal Gov-
ernment in the prosecution of the war. This is well 
recognized by Respondents in the allegations of their 
respective complaints wherein it is stated that these 
payments were made by the National Government ''to 
insure the maximum necessary production of essential 
metal for use by the National Government in the waging 
of war, to induce this plaintiff and other like industries 
to enter upon an operation on behalf of the National 
Government and its legitimate function of prosecuting 
war". (The italics added.) The premium payments were 
made for production of ore, to be used by the Federal 
Government in its prosecution of the war, and are based 
upon the recoverable metals normally recovered from 
such ores. The amount paid by the Federal Government 
at the time the ores are smelted or refined is made in 
lieu of increasing the purchase price to the smelting or 
refining companies, which, in turn, would correspond-
ingly increase the purchase price upon the refined metals 
and ultimately upon the finished products purchased by 
the Federal Government. Just as in the case of Helver-
ing v. Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry Company, supra, "the 
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amount received from the state for the maintenance of 
the ferry was gain to the taxpayer; and it was gain 
derived from the capital invested in the ferry and the 
labor involved in it::; operation" so in the instant cases 
the amounts received by Respondents from Metals Re-
serve Company was gain to Respondents arising out of 
the production and disposal of their ores and formed 
a part of the "gross amount received for or the gross 
value of" such ores. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has had 
occasion to pass upon a rather similar situation to the 
one here involved in the case of Texas and Pacific Rail-
way Company v. United States, 286 U. S. 285, 52 S. Ct. 
528, 76 L. gd. 1108. Pursuant to the provisions of Sec-
tion 209 of the Transportation Act of 1920, the Federal 
Government guaranteed to the Texas and Pacific Rail-
way Company, ''a minimum operating revenue.'' Since 
the actual operating revenue received from fares and 
charges did not reach the amount guaranteed, the balance 
was made up by a payment from the Federal Govern-
ment. Such amounts were included by the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue as part of the company's gross 
income. The additional tax thus resulting was protested 
on the ground that the ''guaranteed payment was not 
income from operation of the railroads but was a sub-
sidy"; that being a subsidy "the guaranteed payment 
is not income within the meaning of the 16th Amend-
ment." Chapter 18, 40 Stat. at L., 1057, 1065, provided 
that the term "gross income" did not include "the 
value of property acquired by gift.'' In speaking of the 
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plan whereby the Government guaranteed the railroad 
company a minimum operating revenue, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
"While the Government had either paid or 
was obligated to pay just compensation for their 
requisition, the amount if it was known to be 
insufficient for rehabilitation of the roads as 
privately owned and operated organizations. 
Until rates could be adjusted to meet increased 
expenses, loans be negotiated, and operating 
forces realigned and reintegrated, the credit of 
the carriers must by some means be re-estab-
lished. Thus the Government had a real obliga-
tion, not readily susceptible of accurate measure-
ment, to assist in the restoration of normal con-
ditions. The purpose of the guaranty provision 
was to stabilize the credit position of the roads 
by assuring them a minimum operating income. 
They were bound to operate their properties in 
order to avail themselves of the Government's 
proffer. Under the terms of the statute no sum 
could be received save as a result of operation. 
If the fruits of the employment of a road's 
capital and labor should fall below a fixed mini-
mum then the Government agreed to make up the 
deficiency, and if the income were to exceed that 
minimum the carrier bound itself to pay the excess 
into the federal treasury. In the latter event the 
carrier unquestionably would have been obligated 
to pay income tax measured by actual earnings; in 
the former, it ought not to be in a better position 
than if it had earned the specified minimum.'' 
Concluding then that the amount received from 
the Federal Government was just as much a part of the 
income of the railroad company frorn its operations as 
its fares and charges, the Supreme Court stated: 
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"Clearly, then the amount paid to bring the 
yield from operation up to the required minimum 
was as much income from operation as were the 
railroad's receipts from fares and charges. The 
sums received under the act were not subsidies 
or gifts-that is, contributions to the capital of 
the railroads,-and this fact distinguishes cases 
such as Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U. S. 628, 69 
L. Ed. 1124, 45 S. Ct. 614, where the payments 
were conditioned upon construction work per-
formed. Here they were to be measured by a 
deficiency in operating- income, and might be used 
for the payment of dividends, of operating ex-
penses, of capital charges, or for any other pur-
pose within the corporate authority, just as any 
other operating revenue might he applied. The 
Government's payments were not in their nature 
bounties, but an addition to a depleted operating 
revenue consequent upon a federal activity.'' 
See also Boston Elevated Ry. Co. v. Commissioner 
(C. C. A. 1st), 131 Fed. (2d) 161. 
In the case of Baboquivari Cattle Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 9th), 135 F. (2d) 
114, the court was concerned with the problem of deter-
mining whether monies received by the taxpayer from 
the Federal Government pursuant to the Soil Conserva-
tion and Domestic Allotment Act constituted income for 
the purpose of taxation. The court characterized the 
payments as follows: 
"It is plain that the moneys received were 
not exempt as gifts under Sec. 22 (b) ( 3) of the 
Revenue Act of 1936, 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. 
Acts, page 825; they were earned payments made 
upon a consideration. On oral argument peti-
tioner did not seriously contend that they were 
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gifts. Its contention, in summary, is that the 
payments were not income at all, but capital 
subsidies. The taxpayer attempts to distinguish 
between types of payments made under the Act, 
those for inaction-as for refraining from pro-
duction or for producing a limited amount only 
of a given crop-being said by petitioner to he 
classifiable as "income subsidies" because de-
signed to supplement income; whereas subsidies 
for positive outlays such as those made here 
are said, on the authority of l'Jdwards v. Cuba 
Railroad Co., 268 U. S. 628, 45 S. Ct. 614, 69 
L. Ed., 1124, to he classifiable as 'capital sub-
sidies.' 
"We are not able to discover in the Act or in 
the administrative practices of the Department of 
Agriculture any justification for these nice dis-
tinctions. We think the pertinent regulations of 
the Secretary afford no basis for them. Under 
these regulations a farmer is not entitled to re-
ceive or retain a payment if he has pursued prac-
tices tending to defeat the conservation program. 
Thus a beneficiary does not earn a payment 
me.rely by making an improvement; he earns it 
in part by compliance with conditions in respect 
of the proper ttse of his land. For example, if 
the utility of a range has been improved by the 
building of a reservoir, the right to have or retain 
the subsidy for the improvement would he de-
feated if the grower overgrazed his land or in-
dulges in similar injurious practices. 
"It is of little importance, we think, what 
name be applied to the paymen.ts, whether they 
be called 'subsidies' as insisted upon by the tax-
payer, or 'benefits' as they were termed by the 
Board. In either event they are within the broad 
concept of income as that term is defined in Sec. 
22(a) of the 1936 act. Consult Eisner v. Macom-
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her, 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521, 
9 A. L. R. 1570. No part of the sums paid to the 
petitioner were required to be placed by him in 
a particular account or fund. The payments were 
not earmarked, nor was there any restriction 
on their use. Petitioner was free to use the money 
for any purpose it might see fit, as to defray 
operating expenses or to pay dividends or to 
purchase an automobile.'' 
The foregoing analysis of the court with respect 
to the nature of the payments received by the taxpayer 
from the Federal Government applies with equal vigor 
to the premium payments involved in the instant mat-
ters. Nor does the fact that an income tax statute was 
involved in the Baboquivari case, whereas in the instant 
matters we are concerned with an occupation tax, affect 
the reasoning of the court. If the monies received by 
Respondents herein from the Federal Government con-
stitute income to them and. not mere ''gifts'' as they 
were characterized by the District Court, such income 
must have been derived from a specific activity on the 
part of the Mining Companies. This activity, of course, 
was the production of ores-and more ores. The pay-
ments received were for the additional ores produced 
for the benefit of the Federal Government. As such, the 
premium payments constitute a part of the ''gross 
amount received fo!' or gross value of" such metallifer-
ous ores. 
While none of the foregoing cases cited in support 
of Appellants' position are directly in point as to both 
the facts and issues involved, nevertheless the reasoning 
and analysis of the question of law by the several courts 
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illustrate the soundness of Appellants' position herein. 
However, there has been one case decided involving 
metal premium payments such as those received by the 
Respondents herein. Klies vs. Linnane (Montana 1945) 
15G P. (2nd) 183. That case determines that under the 
provisions of the net proceeds statute of ~M on tan a, 
premium payments are not a part of the "gross yield or 
value in dollars and cents" of the minerals. Apparently 
the Montana court adopts the theory advanced by the 
District Court in the instant matters in determining the 
premium payments to be "gifts" from the Federal Gov-
ernment. Notwithstanding that Metals Reserve Com-
pany, in its announcement stated that the price of over-
production metals would be 17 cents per pound for cop-
per, 11 cents per pound for zinc and 91;4 cents per pound 
for lead, the Montana Supreme Court states that "Metals 
Reserve Company does not * * * increase the price of 
the metal." We opine that the Montana court did not 
have before it all the orders and pronouncements of the 
Federal agencies, nor all of the facts and circumstances 
hereinbefore set forth in Appellants' brief. 
The court goes on to hold that the premium pay-
ments increase the "value of the enterprise by making 
it more profitable" but do not increase the value of the 
metals involved. We do not sec how such a distinction 
in law or in fact can be made. The premium payments 
are paid upon the production of copper, lead and zinc, 
based upon a total purchase price of 17 cents per pound 
for copper, 91;4 cents per pound for lead and 11 cents per 
pound for zinc. The amount received from the Federal 
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Government is just as much a part of the amount re-
ceived for such ores as the amount paid by the smelter 
or other refining- company. Both are paid for the pro-
duction of such ore based upon the actual recoverable 
metal content thereof, and are paid upon ores actually 
received-by the smelting- company in the crude state 
and by the Federal Government in the refined or finished 
product. 
We do not feel that the reasoning- of the Montana 
court can be upheld. Nor does the opinion refer to any 
cases as supporting- the analysis or reasoning- therein 
contained. 
There is also a definite differentiation between the 
mining- tax statutes of the State of Utah and the mining-
tax statutes of the State of Montana. Whereas, in 
Montana ''the annual net proceedg, of all mines and 
mining- claims, shall be taxed as other personal property" 
(italics added), in our state the Occupation Tax is 
assessed upon the rig-ht of the respective mining com-
panies to do business, such tax being based on the ''gross 
amount" received by every mining company from its 
ores. The title to Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1937, 
imposing a mining- occupation tax, states that a tax 
is to be imposed ''on all engaged in the business of 
mining or producing metalliferous ores.'' 
Montana, too, has an occupation tax similar to 
ours, but again the basis for determining the value of 
the "gross yield" is entirely different. Section 2344-3, 
Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, Annotated, defines 
the ''total gross value'' of the product to be: 
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'' * * * the market value of all merchantable 
metals or mineral products extracted or recovered 
thereby, as shown by the gross smelter returns 
of such metals or mineral product in dollars and 
cents, without any deductions for costs of smelt-
ing, reduction or treatment, or otherwise, based 
upon the ave.rage quotations of the price of such 
tnetals, or mineral products, in the city of New 
York, as evidenced by some established authority 
or market report such as the Engineering and 
Mining Journal of New York City, or other stand-
ard publications, giving the market reports dur-
ing the calendar year immediately preceding.'' 
(Italics added.) 
In the case of State ex rel Snidow et al v. State 
Board of Equalization et al, 93 Mont. 19, 25, 17 P (2d) 
68, 77, the Supreme Court held: 
''In fixing the market value of zinc in Mon-
tana, based upon the price of the metal in St. 
Louis, the board clearly violated the law, for 
the statute requires the New York price to be 
taken as a basis, and that price shows a differ-
ential of 35 cents per pound between St. Louis 
and New York.'' 
We find no such statutes or decisions in our state 
with respect to our mining occupation tax. 
ARGUMENT II 
Respondents' final position, which was apparently 
adopted by the District Court also, is that the inclusion 
of the premium payments here involved in the "gross 
amount'' received for the ores of the respective Mining 
Companies constitutes a seizure of monies paid by the 
National Government in the interest of national defense 
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and is a direct and substantial interference with and 
burden upon the National Government; that said tax 
is in violation of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States and Section 7 of Article 
I of the Constitution of Utah. In the case of Helvering 
v. Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry Co., supra, involving the 
taxation of monies paid to the Ferry Company by the 
State of Maryland, it was contended that such payments 
were exempt from taxation because "a contribution 
by the state toward the maintenance of the public ferry.'' 
The court rejected such contention in the following 
language: 
''On the second question, there can be no 
question hut that the operation of a public ferry 
as a link in the state highway system is a proper 
function of the state and that the proceeds of 
such operation by the state itself would not be 
subject to the Federal income tax (Jamestown & 
Newport Ferry Co. v. Commissioner, 1 Cir., 41 F. 
(2d) 920); but it by no means follows that the 
income of a private corporation engaged in oper-
ating such a ferry would not be subject to such 
tax. Cf. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax 
Commission of :Maryland, 28a U. S. 291, 293, 51 
S. Ct. 4i34, 435, 75 L. Ed. 1042; Broad River 
Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178, 181, 53 S. 
Ct. :326, 327, 77 L. Ed. 685; South Carolina Power 
Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission D. C., 
52 F. (2d) 515, 526. Nor is the payment made 
by the state to a private corporation necessarily 
exempt from such tax because made as com-
pensation or part compensation for a service 
which the state itself might have performed. 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 
38 
S. Ct. 172, 17 4, 70 L. J1Jd. 384; Underwood v. 
Commissioner, 4 Cir., 56 F. (2d) 67. 
''The taxpayer here was a private corpora-
tion engaged in the operation of a public ferry. 
The greater part of its income was derived from 
tolls collected from vehicles and passengers trans-
ported. The subsidy paid by the state increased 
its annual income in the same manner as its 
income would have been increased by a contract 
entered into with the state for the performance 
of any other public service; and the tax was 
imposed without discrimination as to whether 
its income was derived from charges made to 
private individuals or from the state subsidy. 
Such tax cannot be said, in the light of the facts 
to which we have adverted, to impair in any 
substantial manner taxpayer's ability to discharge 
its obligations to the state or the state's ability 
to procure the services of private individuals to 
aid in the undertaking.'' 
The leading case on this subject is James vs. Dravo 
Contracting Company, 302 U. S. 1i}4, 58 S. Ct. 208, 
82 L. Ed. 155, 114 A. L. R. 318. There the State of 
West Virginia, under an occu,pation tax statute impos-
ing a tax of 2 per cent upon the ''gross income of the 
business'' of any person engaged in the state in the 
business of contracting, included in taxpayer's "gross 
income'' the amounts received by him from the Federal 
Government for the construction of locks and dams upon 
Federal property in the State of West Virginia. The 
Supreme Court of the United States in holding such 
tax valid stated: 
''The tax is not laid upon the Government, 
its property or officers. Dobbins v. Commission-
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ers, 16 Pet. 435, 449, 450. 
"The tax is not laid upon an instrumentality 
of the Government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 
~Wheat. i316; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 
9 '\Vheat. 738; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 
501; Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 
374; Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 
341; New York ex rel Rogers v. Graves, 299 
U. S. 401. Hespondent is an independent con-
tractor. The tax is non-discriminatory." 
Answering the contention of the taxpayer that the 
tax inc1 eased the cof"t to the government of the services 
rendered, the court said : 
"But if it be assumed that the gross receipts 
tax may increase the cost to the Government, 
that fact would not invalidate the tax. With 
respect to that effect, a tax on the contractor's 
gross receipts would not differ from a tax on 
the contractor's property and equipment neces-
sarily used in the performance of the contract. 
Concededly, such a tax may validly be laid.'' 
See also Alabama vs. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, 
------ S. Ct. ______ , 86 L. F~d. 3, (involving state sales tax); 
Fidelity & Deposit Company vs. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 
319 (involving a tax upon the gross premiums received 
by a company where there were receipts derived from 
the Federal Government). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit: 
The amounts received by Respondents from Metals 
Reserve Company were properly included as a pa.rt of 
the "gross amount received for or gross value of" the 
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ores produced and sold under the statutes of Utah and 
the inclusion of such premium payments did not violate 
the provisions of either the Federal or State Constitution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILJ<JS, 
Attorney General 
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